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'The Tiger Versus the Dragon: An Overview of Sino-Indian Relations' by Saksham Kothari

Read on as Saksham Kothari, from Lok Nayak Jayaprakash Narayan National Institute of Criminology and Forensic Science, elaborates upon the nuances of Sino-Indian relations through the sands of time.


"Hostility can be overcome by political dodging or pressure but that way heart-ranking is produced, not unity. Where the principle of justice is materially ignored, we cause a wound which will not heal easily. He who points this out is not the offender, but he who inflicts the wound."

- C. Rajagopalachari [1]


India and China are the two largest countries in the world in terms of population and collectively account for more than a sixth of global GDP. China also continues to be India’s second largest trading partner in goods [2]. In ancient times, despite the limitations posed by the snowcapped Himalayas and the vast oceanic expanse in the east, Indo-China relations were cordial and exemplified through trade as well as spiritual and educational engagements. Several Indian monks travelled to China (such as the Zen patriarch Bodhidharma in the fifth century CE) to preach and to help translate Buddhist texts into the Chinese language. Several south-east Asian and Chinese scholars made their way to Nalanda University including the Chinese monk Xuanzang [3]. The Chinese perception of India altered during the colonial period marked as it were by the opium war and a perceived threat towards Chinese suzerainty in Tibet and control over Xinjiang [4].


Hence to evaluate India-China relationship, it is best to view it in strategic, global and economic terms. This essay looks to build on the historical overview of Independent India's relationship with China, underscoring the major disputes and divergences as well as cooperation and convergences.


The Unassailable Dispute


In 1914, by the terms of the Simla Agreement, the first customary boundary (McMahon Line) was demarcated between the British, the Tibetan and the Chinese representatives, although it wasn't rectified by the Chinese [5]. The official Indian map in 1950 showed the McMahon Line as a settled international boundary in the east but the entire western sector with a colour wash and the annotation “boundary undefined" [6]. It was only by 1954 that the Survey of India maps began showing the Indian boundary in the western sector as already fixed along our current claim line [7]. In January 1959, the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai made it clear in writing for the first time that China disputed the McMahon Line in the eastern sector and the Kunlun boundary in the western sector, and expressed the desire to negotiate the entire India-China boundary line [8]. Prime Minister (PM) Nehru’s response of 22nd March 1959, which forms an important cornerstone of India’s view of the boundary endorsed that neither side should take unilateral action, attached importance to the sanctity of McMahon Line and cited 1842 treaty in support of its claim in the Western sector [9].The granting of asylum to the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama in March 1959 deteriorated bilateral relations further. In 1960 during his India visit, Zhou suggested that China might accept the McMahon Line as the eastern boundary if India cedes its claim and accepts the Chinese advances made in the Aksai Chin [10].


As time passed, tensions flared between the armies of the two countries, eventually leading to first border clashes at Longju towards the end of August 1959 followed by the ambush to an Indian police patrol at Kongka pass in October 1959 [11]. In the words of Nehru, the Kongka pass incident ensured that “we cannot agree to or submit to anything that affects India's honour and self-respect, and our integrity and independence.” On October 20, 1962, the Chinese attack led to a month long war and culminated in the unilateral Chinese ceasefire on November 20th. It was accompanied by Chinese withdrawal to 20 kilometres behind what it described as the LAC as of November 7, 1959 (described only in general terms on maps not to scale). The Chinese declaration of a cease-fire and withdrawal was probably caused by logistical difficulty in maintaining troops in harsh winter as well as the preoccupation caused by the Cultural Revolution and guerrilla activity in Tibet [12].


While the bilateral ties froze, in 1976, the Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs established the China Study Group under the Foreign Secretary to recommend revised patrolling limits, rules of engagement and the pattern of Indian presence along the border with China [13]. The Sumdorongchu valley conflict in 1986 took seven years of negotiation to settle and resulted in the then PM Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in December 1988; in which the two nations agreed to negotiate a boundary settlement, maintain peace and tranquility along the border and develop ties in other spheres [14]. On 7th September 1993, during PM Narasimha Rao’s visit to China both the countries signed the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas. It committed both the countries to maintain the status quo on the border, created a Joint Working Group to “advise on the resolution of differences between the two sides on the alignment of the line of actual control” and build military confidence-building measures based on the concept of “mutual and equal security" [15]. This treaty ensured that the differences in boundary alignment must not hinder growth of India-China relations in other spheres.


Allies of Shared Interest


In 2003, during PM Vajpayee’s visit to China, both India and China acknowledged the other’s sovereignty over Sikkim and Tibet respectively and mutually agreed to appoint special representatives ‘to explore from the perspective of the overall bilateral relationship the framework of a boundary settlement.’ This led to the adoption of ‘Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question’ during Chinese premier Wen Jiabao’s India visit in 2005. This clearly laid out references of ‘easily identifiable geographic features’ and safeguard of ‘due interests of their settled population in the border areas’ in settling the boundary alignment [16]. The 1993 agreement allowed greater trade, educational and tourist exchanges between India and China. Between 1992-2012, the bilateral trade expanded sixty-seven times and even the two nations’ militaries engaged in joint exercises in 2007, 2008 and 2013 [17]. India and China have evolved a Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity and a ‘Shared Vision for the 21st Century' [18]. The two nations have also engaged in high level summit meetings at Wuhan and Chennai (in 2018 and 2019 respectively) [19].


The Bandung Conference of 1955 was Communist China’s first experience with the developing world of Asia and Africa and it was made possible through Nehru’s policy of constructive engagement with China [20]. Though the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence developed as part of a Sino-Indian agreement over Tibet didn’t stop the relations to go further south, its principles still form a core yardstick that modern nations apply in their bilateral relations. India and China have come along relatively well in multilateral forums (like the Copenhagen Climate Accord and the WTO Doha Round of trade negotiations), especially when they need each other to protect the interests of the developing world. Currently, India and China share stage in groupings of common interest to accelerate their domestic development such as BRICS, BASIC, RIC, ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asia Summit, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, etc [21].


However, while dealing bilaterally, China continues to unnecessarily provoke India through intimidation and provocation tactics. The standoff at Depsang in 2013 that lasted for three weeks is a prominent example [22]. Other such incidents include relatively minor irritants such as issuing stapled visas to Indian citizens from Jammu and Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh and China’s negative reaction to India’s Defence Minister and PM’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh in the past, to major destabilising issues such as China’s proposed One Belt One Road initiative that passes through Pakistan occupied Kashmir, the military standoff at Pangong lake and China stonewalling India’s bid for an entry in the Nuclear Supplier’s Group and permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council [23]. There are also certain long standing issues that raise suspicion regarding ‘the other’ in both nations: for India, it is China’s control over Shaksgam Valley (ceded illegally by Pakistan in 1963) and its claim over Arunachal Pradesh [24]. On the other hand, China objects India’s enhanced role as a regional balancer in South China Sea and Indian Ocean as well as India’s participation in Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Malabar naval exercises with Japan and United States, whom China perceives in a bad light.


Asymmetrical Economic Dependency


The Chinese companies have made greater inroads in the Indian economy in recent times. Between 2014-2017, Chinese investment in India rose from US$1.6 billion to US$8 billion. There is also a marked shift away from state-driven investment in infrastructure to market-driven Chinese private sector investment in pharmaceutical and technological sectors of the Indian market, especially through venture investments and acquiring stakes in start-ups [25]. Meanwhile, more than half of the total Indian imports (that constituted 80% of the trade [2018]) from China involves purchases of Chinese machinery and equipment besides project contracting. Indian exports to China are mostly limited to raw materials, such as low-grade ores, cotton, and chemicals. Not only that, China also accounts for 73% of telecommunication equipment, 82% of semiconductor devices, 81% of antibiotics and 75% of active pharmaceutical ingredients used by India [26]. By March 2020, 18 of India’s 30 unicorns (start-ups with valuation of over $1 billion) were heavily funded through China, driven by $4 billion investment in Indian start-ups by Chinese tech investors [27]. Chinese smartphone manufacturers in India already have a 66% share of the smartphone market as of the first quarter of 2019 [28].


Even though this influx of Chinese capital has benefitted Indian tech companies and start-ups to scale-up, it has also opened up floodgates of potential security risks (such as cross-border data flows, control access to end-users and suppression of criticism towards China). It has called for India to develop a strong data localization legislation, a robust regulatory framework for overseas investment, diversifying sources of vital imports and strengthening domestic capability. India should also push for reducing the trade deficit by advocating for reduction of non-tariff barriers to Indian companies in the Chinese market. Both India and China have worked well globally on issues ranging from reforms in Bretton Woods institutions, labour laws, anti-piracy operations and climate accord negotiations.


In an ever evolving world, an aggressive China will have to make adjustments with what Bismarck referred to as the nightmare of countervailing coalitions [29]. Meanwhile, it is essential for India to secure its citizens’ prosperity and build national capability through good governance and military modernization. It will also be reasonable to develop the nation’s economic and diplomatic footprint in areas such as securing regional sea lanes (for example, the Eyes in the Sky Programme in the Strait of Malacca), medical diplomacy and improving its standing in the underdeveloped and developing world through trade and outreach measures rather than having an aggressive involvement in countervailing coalitions to manage China.





Bibliography:


[1]. Ramachandra Guha, Makers of Modern India (Gurgaon: Penguin Books, 2012), 465.



[3]. Shyam Saran, How India Sees the World: Kautilya to the 21st Century (New Delhi: Juggernaut Books, 2017), 106.


[4]. Saran, How India Sees the World, 111.


[5]. Shivshankar Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy (Gurgaon: Penguin Books, 2018), 13.


[6]. Menon, Choices, 22.


[7]. Saran, How India Sees the World, 129.


[8]. Menon, Choices, 14.


[9]. Srinath Raghavan, ‘A Missed Opportunity? The Nehru-Zhou Enlai Summit of 1960’ in India and the Cold War, ed. Manu Bhagavan (Gurgaon: Penguin Random House, 2019), 106.


[10]. Menon, Choices, 14.


[11]. Raghavan, India and the Cold War, 106-11.


[12]. Menon, Choices, 16.


[13]. Menon, Choices, 19.


[14]. Menon, Choices, 20.


[15]. Menon, Choices, 26-27.


[16]. Saran, How India Sees the World, 142.


[17]. Menon, Choices, 29.


[18]. Shashi Tharoor, Pax Indica: India and the World of the 21st Century (Gurgaon: Penguin Books, 2013), 132.


[19]. S. Jaishankar, The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World (Noida: HarperCollins Publishers, 2020), 151.


[20]. Amitav Acharya, East of India, South of China: Sino-Indian Encounters in Southeast Asia (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2017), 99.


[21]. Tharoor, Pax Indica.


[22]. Menon, Choices, 31.


[23]. Tharoor, Pax Indica, 139-40.


[24]. Saran, How India Sees the World, 124.


[25]. Ananth Krishnan, Following the Money: China Inc.’s growing stake in India-China relations (New Delhi: Brookings Institution India Center, 2020), 5.


[26]. Krishnan, Following the Money, 10.


[27]. Amit Bhandari, Blaise Fernandes and Aashna Agarwal, Chinese Investments in India (Mumbai: Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations, 2020), 8.


[28]. Bhandari, Fernandes and Agarwal, Chinese Investments in India, 15.


[29]. Saran, How India Sees the World, 273.








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