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Fall of Kabul: A Gain to Islamabad and Caution for New Delhi by Srijan Sharma

History repeats itself and for Afghanistan history repeated itself after 20 years when the Taliban took over the country and marked the fall of the democratically elected Ghani government. Now a major question or anticipation which haunts the global order is how terror groups will mark their presence in Taliban’s Afghanistan and how the wave of terrorism is going to flow.


The Two Players of South Asia

This critical geopolitical development will indirectly or directly have rippling effects on two arch-rivals: New Delhi and Islamabad. The effect will put one on the caution side and on gain’s side. Amidst these two players, there is one more major player who sees reward in Afghanistan- China. Moreover, Russia is also keeping a regional-specific view over Afghanistan. Once things get settled and Kabul transits into the Taliban era, the stakes of everyone would automatically start to function and when they start to bat their respective interests, the interactions of those stakeholders/countries with this reformed Taliban group are worth observing, especially its effects in the Asian Region.But as of now, the anticipation of not worrying or casually setting an approach towards Kabul just on the pretext that this time Taliban have sophistically presented themselves in the power transit process would be wrong. It is a well established fact that Taliban’s ideological designs and beliefs are majorly governed and influenced by fundamentalist and extremist views. Therefore, the present instability in Afghanistan and Taliban’s future conduct will show its true colors in the coming time. On the other hand, the takeover would be a confidence builder to Al Qaeda, ISIS who are dreaming of the Islamic Caliphate. However, in any case, some of the highly speculated threats and gains would be possible to both former and latter in the coming time.


New Delhi’s Caution and Islamabad Gain

Taliban’s takeover would prove a chance for Islamabad to develop its strategic intellect against India in both unconventional and conventional wars. As history speaks that in the past Islamabad had cultivated covert relations with the Taliban and this time Islamabad would not leave any stone unturned in reviving those relations.

Islamabad has a strategic depth policy towards Afghanistan. This policy was mostly in a defunct state till Kabul was stable and Ghani was there. Though several attempts were made, mostly they were unsuccessful as New Delhi had smartly through its developmental approach kept Islamabad’s influence at bay, but now tables seem to have been turned, as Taliban taking stage would kick start Islamabad’s strategic depth policy.

In actuality, Islamabad does not treat it as a mere policy construct but as a big military strategy against India. This strategy is two-fold; one can be studied conventionally, and second can be unconventional. In a conventional way, in event of war between India and Pakistan or any aggressive escalation in such situations, Pakistan would have an option to fall back towards Afghanistan regroup and then organize a counteroffensive against India this would lessen the chances of damage or get disorganized and Pakistan can easily avail resources and strategize the course of the war. This ultimately increases Pakistan’s chances of survival in war and gives them chance to rally from Afghanistan.

Now the unconventional side is a well-understood fact that Pakistan uses terrorism as an instrument against India. In this strategy, Pakistan would now be using Afghanistan as a territorial pawn against India by shifting the terror bases around Durand lines or in interior regions of Afghanistan by mobilizing terror groups, etc. In short, Pakistan would get a chance to revamp its terror modules and make it more effective by waging terrorism in more indirect ways (via Afghanistan) than earlier.

The first target would be Union Territory J&K. Pakistan would try every possible means via Afghanistan to ignite trouble and create disturbance in the J&K. Like it used to do in the early 90s where the violence and terror were at their peak in the valley. However, there is one roadblock or a double edge sword that Pakistan might face is that keeping up the relations with the Taliban. The Tehreek E Taliban (TTP) which is operating inside Pakistan is all out against Pakistan’s regime and in counter-response, Pakistan Military and ISI had started a National Action Plan which involved a heavy military crackdown against TTP. This made some sects of the Taliban unhappy with the posture of Pakistan. Moreover, this strategic depth strategy would also give Pakistan a diplomatic advantage by giving Pakistan space to exercise its influence in the central Asian market and to Central Asian countries against India this goes for China as well. Therefore, given the TTP apprehension for Pakistan, there are high chances of frictions with Pakistan.

Neither do we have an assertion on the concrete basis that relation with Afghan Taliban and ISI would flourish well in the coming time nor do we have the concrete assertion that how much Islamabad would hold or sustain on its Strategic Depth Strategy in near future. However, whatever may be the case, New Delhi cannot outrightly ignore the possible red flags associated with ISI and Taliban or threats that may arise in the coming time because possibilities are high.


Options For New Delhi At Present Stage

New Delhi maintained its position of rejecting the Taliban’s objectives of making Afghanistan an Islamic Emirates and also rejected for recognizing a government or power which have taken over by force. For New Delhi given the present situation must exercise caution and carefully observe all the political and non-political activities taking place in Afghanistan right now even observe the influence of Pakistan which may have begun in the power corridors of the Taliban. From a security and intelligence point of view, any hasty steps would complicate New Delhi’s situation and options in Afghanistan and would further harm communications, influence, and assets in Afghanistan. Perhaps, ISI would want New Delhi to take some steps in panic which would contribute to shrinking New Delhi’s footprints in Afghanistan. It is very important right now for New Delhi to maintain its footprints in Afghanistan and not let the ISI take any tactical advantage at this stage. Alert, Observe and Response should be three golden rules right now for New Delhi. On the other hand, MEA should make every possible attempt to evacuate its citizens in distress or who wish to return and closely monitor its embassies/consulates in Afghanistan.

These are some primary set of responses towards Kabul and rest as said observing and monitoring the situation in Afghanistan is key as it would give some inputs to New Delhi and help to build a strategic foresight on how things will proceed in Afghanistan and what all steps would be feasible to take in coming time.


This piece has been authored by Srijan Sharma of Kirori Mal College, University of Delhi. The author is working as an Intelligence/Defence analyst for a journal and writes for various publications on matters of security, intelligence and international politics. The article has been edited for brevity and clarity. The views and opinions expressed in this article are entirely those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of The Civil Services Forum.



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